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In this Essay, I raise a metatheoretical question concerning the
relationship between what seem to be two distinct categories of
projects that might be lumped together under the rubric of empirical
study of judicial performance. One kind of empirical project aims
broadly at developing a social-scientific theory of judging, or as one
legal philosopher recently put it, identifying the “causes” of legal
decisions.1 Another kind of project aims at identifying quantitative,
measurable criteria to provide an objective basis for evaluating the
quality of judicial performance or, to use a more loaded term, “judicial
merit.”2 I attempt to explain the distinction between these two types of
projects and consider whether the very possibility of success in the
former undermines the point of the latter. Would a theory that could
predict how any given judge would likely decide any given case obviate
the usefulness of general criteria for measuring judicial quality? I
suggest here that the answer is no, because the two projects address
fundamentally different types of questions.
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1. Leslie Green, Law and the Causes of Judicial Decisions (Univ. of Oxford, Oxford Legal
Research Paper No. 14/2009, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1374608.
2. See, e.g., Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Choosing the Next Supreme Court Justice:
An Empirical Ranking of Judge Performance, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 23 (2004).
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One kind of empirical study of judicial decisionmaking might be
regarded as continuous with the broader goal of social science, which I
take to be something like understanding human behavior in general. I
see the ultimate aim of this sort of empirical inquiry as developing a
theory that explains and predicts judicial decisionmaking in roughly the
same way a psychological theory might seek to explain and predict
other observed phenomena of human behavior, such as the tendency
to obey authority. Just as a successful psychological theory of
obedience might, among other things, identify the conditions that
explain why and predict whether a given subject will obey an order
given by an authority figure in a particular context (for example,
personal characteristics of the subject, the subject’s relation to the
authority figure, the nature of the order, and its expected
consequences), one might likewise consider an empirical theory of
judging in this vein successful if it allows particular conditions to be
identified—for example, political ideology, characteristics of the
litigants, particular features of a case’s history, or the provenance of
relevant precedent—that explain and predict judicial outcomes.3
Within this broadly defined empirical project of explaining and
predicting judicial decisionmaking as human social behavior—one
might call it the project of “naturalizing jurisprudence”4—there are
multiple theoretical perspectives that might be relevant. A single type
of observed judicial decisionmaking might be understood
simultaneously through the frameworks of sociology, political science,
social psychology, cognitive psychology, and perhaps even
neuropsychology. Whether or how all these empirical perspectives
might be integrated remains unclear. Presumably, a grand unified
theory of judicial decisionmaking is no more and no less likely than a
grand unified theory of human behavior in general. All of these
scientific perspectives may be viewed as having one common, general
aim: they seek to provide causal explanations of judicial decisions—

3. The numerous political science studies that examine correlations between judicial
behavior and political affiliation within the framework of the “attitudinal” model of judging are
perhaps the most familiar examples of this sort of theorizing. See Jack Knight, Are Empiricists
Asking the Right Questions About Judicial Decisionmaking?, 58 DUKE L.J. 1531, 1534–38 (2009).
4. See BRIAN LEITER, NATURALIZING JURISPRUDENCE: ESSAYS ON AMERICAN LEGAL
REALISM AND NATURALISM IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY (2007). I realize my usage here may be
somewhat broader than Professor Leiter’s intended meaning. For a very helpful explanation of
Leiter’s notion of naturalized jurisprudence, see Robin Bradley Kar, On the Prospects of a
Naturalized Jurisprudence, NOTRE DAME PHIL. REV., July 31, 2009, http://ndpr.nd.edu/review
.cfm?id=16805 (reviewing LEITER, supra).
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theories that identify the causal predicates of observed decisions and
do so with predictive power.5
A second type of empirical study of judicial performance seems
quite different in its basic aim from the project of naturalizing
jurisprudence. The goal of this second type of study might broadly be
described as identifying quantified measures of good judicial
performance—for example, citation counts, dissent rates, and
productivity—that can be used to assess and even rank the quality of
sitting judges, judicial candidates, and courts. This type of undertaking
can be seen as a way of compiling otherwise inaccessible information
that would presumably be of significant value to public officials, the
citizenry, and judges themselves in evaluating and monitoring judicial
performance. Public ratings of judges and courts based on this
information might have the added desirable effect of sussing out the
opaque criteria that various political actors use to champion particular
judges or candidates, insofar as those ratings would exert pressure on
such actors to give public explanations supporting any low-rated
candidates they seek to promote.6
What is the relationship between these two empirical projects of
naturalizing jurisprudence and of measuring judicial performance?
One possibility is that the need for objective measures of judicial
performance is a function of the current infancy of the science of
identifying the causes of judicial decisions. That is, objective measures
that serve as proxies for judicial quality are only necessary because of
the lack robust theories that would predict how a particular sort of
judge would likely decide a particular sort of case. If such a theory
existed, there would be no point in trying to develop any general
measure of judicial quality.

5. This “naturalizing” project of identifying the causes of judicial decisions seems entangled
with certain substantive jurisprudential claims associated with legal realism. Some empirical
studies, for example, seem to start with the assumption that in many or even most cases, the law
admits more than one possible outcome and so cannot be the cause of the actual outcome of the
case. These studies presuppose that some other set of factors exists and causes the outcome; an
empirical question remains regarding what those factors might be. This Essay is not the place to
take issue with this argument (which I have admittedly caricatured), but I see no reason why an
empirical study of judging should have to accept this argument at the outset. It might turn out, to
be sure, that the theories with the most explanatory and predictive power tend to deemphasize
the law as a determinant of decisions, but then again, it might not. It seems patently questionbegging to assume from the outset that judicial decisions must be explained by extrinsic, nonlegal
considerations.
6. See Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati & Eric A. Posner, Judicial Evaluations and Information
Forcing: Ranking State High Courts and Their Judges, 58 DUKE L.J. 1313 (2009).
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An example may help draw out the intuitive appeal of this
conjecture. Suppose one could prove that in any case possessing the set
of features F, involving a party with characteristics P, a second party
with characteristics D, and given additional specifiable conditions C, a
judge with a set of characteristics J will always decide the case in a way
that is favorable to the party with characteristics P, whereas a judge
lacking J will always decide against that party. One might argue that
this postulate, if true, would undermine the relevance of any generic
notion of judicial quality—apart from whatever constitutes J
characteristics—in the context of cases with features F. If one could
predict how any particular judge would decide this type of case, there
would be no need for further information about the judge’s qualities,
at least in that limited context. And if analogous predictions could be
made with respect to cases with features F1, F2, and so on, and judges
with characteristics J1, J2, and so on, there would be no more reason
to care about measuring judicial quality in the context of those cases.
Thus, the more progress empiricists make in the project of reducing
judicial decisionmaking to its natural causes, the less relevance any
project of measuring judicial performance will have.
One might argue, in other words, that judicial quality matters
because better judges presumably will make better decisions. But if it
were possible to predict judicial decisions in the manner postulated,
then no one would have reason to care about generic measures of
judicial performance. There would be no reason to fret over proxy
measures of good judicial decisionmaking if social science could deliver
a theory that directly predicts how a particular judge or candidate
would decide particular kinds of cases.
I believe that this argument should be rejected. This argument’s
fallacy involves its reliance on the implicit assumption that empirical
measures of judicial performance are, at their core, nothing more than
an indirect attempt to accomplish one of the goals of the project of
naturalizing jurisprudence—namely, developing a theory with the
power to predict the outcome of judicial decisions on the basis of
specifiable causal predicates. But the project of measuring judicial
performance need not be assimilated to that of theorizing the causes of
judicial decisions. Rather, the project is fundamentally normative and
evaluative in character. The basic question is not about the causes of
decisions, but about what makes a good judge, or what constitute the
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basic virtues of a good judge.7 Whereas the naturalizing project seeks
to provide causal explanations for judicial behavior in a manner
continuous with social science, the empirical study of judicial
performance seeks to make explicit and then reduce to numbers our
value judgments about the relative merits of selected characteristics of
judicial performance. The ultimate test of a causal theory is its
explanatory and predictive power. The test of a measure of judicial
performance is ultimately the normative plausibility of its embedded
value judgments about the core virtues of a judge and how well it
captures those judgments.8 The two projects have incommensurable
aims.
There are, however, some important caveats. I do not deny the
potential relevance of the findings of naturalized jurisprudence to the
project of measuring judicial performance. For example, some
observers might think that any evaluation of judicial performance
should incorporate criteria that capture something like political
independence or capacity for “nonideological” decisionmaking.9 But
what if there were empirical evidence that indisputably established
that, as a matter of fact, political affiliation almost always predicts
judicial outcomes in certain types of cases? I suspect that if that were
the case, there would be reason to doubt whether criteria aimed at
measuring political independence could possibly capture anything
meaningful. Standards of judicial quality must be tempered by
contemporary knowledge regarding the limits of human psychology.
This is a consequence of the basic moral premise that “ought” at least
in some sense implies “can.” To that extent, the study of the causes of
judicial behavior is potentially relevant to the project of measuring
judicial quality. My point is not to deny this possible point of
congruence, but rather to emphasize that society’s concept of a good
judge is not simply given by how most judges in fact tend to behave.
Findings in the science of judicial behavior cannot themselves
determine the normative standards by which judges should be
7. See Lawrence B. Solum, Virtue Jurisprudence: A Virtue-Centered Theory of Judging, 34
METAPHILOSOPHY 178 (2003), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=369940.
8. For example, a study of judicial performance that ranks judges by citation count must
assume—insofar as it is to be regarded as a study of judicial quality—that the ability to produce
opinions that are cited by others is something we reasonably want in a judge. Whether we take
the study seriously will depend on whether this assumption can be defended. This defense would
require some argument that the ability to produce oft-cited writings captures some trait that is
important to our normative ideal of a good judge.
9. See, e.g., Choi et al., supra note 6, at 1323 (“Independence is a hallmark of judicial
quality.”).
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measured and evaluated. This is a consequence of another basic moral
premise, namely, that “is” does not imply “ought.”
The other caveat is that my remarks assume that it is possible to
construct a model of a good judge that is at least to some degree
independent of considered preferences relating to case outcomes. This
assumption means, among other things, that a judgment about whether
a particular individual would make a good judge is not simply reducible
to a set of predictions about the outcomes of cases that would come
before that individual. But what if one were to reject this assumption?
What if the concept of a good judge that best reflected societal and
legal norms did in fact turn out to be nothing more than a reflection of
collective preferences about case outcomes?10 In that case, I do think
that measures of judicial performance that captured the concept might
be collapsible into predictions of judicial behavior. That is, if society’s
notion of a good judge turns out to be nothing more than a set of
predictions about the likelihood of a judge’s reaching particular
outcomes in particular cases, then measures of judicial performance
would be nothing more than proxy predictions about what judges
would probably do in such cases. It might follow, then, that my claim—
that the project of measuring judicial performance is fundamentally
distinct from the project of determining the causes of judicial
decisions—depends on the defensibility of a particular kind of concept
of a good judge, namely, one that is not tied to the desirability of
specific outcomes in particular cases.
I do not think that this conclusion does, in fact, follow. Even if this
sort of cynicism about the concept of a good judge were warranted, I
believe that the project of naturalizing jurisprudence would still remain
fundamentally different from the project of quantifying judicial
performance, because the latter is essentially a normative endeavor in
a way that the former is not. Even if every theorized measure of judicial
performance turned out to be nothing more than an elliptical predictor
of a particular set of case outcomes, every theorist’s proposed measure
of judicial performance would still be answerable to questions about its
underlying normative conception of a good judge. Empirical theories
about the causes of judicial decisions need not answer these questions.

10. I do not argue for the point here, but I do not believe the concept of a good judge is
straightforwardly dependent on preferences regarding case outcomes. I believe, for instance, that
two people can agree about the core virtues of judging even if they have different outcome
preferences.
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Pretend, for example, that one could show that measures of
judicial performance that depend on citation counts tend to highly rank
judges who are more likely to invalidate legislation in federal
constitutional cases. If that were true, then commentors might observe
that these performance measures are empirically reducible to
predictors of how judges will decide those kinds of constitutional cases.
This finding would not, however, undermine my central argument,
which is that the project of empirically measuring judicial performance,
in contrast to the project of identifying the causes of judicial decisions,
is fundamentally normative. The discovery of a sufficiently tight
predictive correlation between citation counts and a disposition to
invalidate legislation might support a claim that any interest in the
former as a measure of judicial quality is really nothing more than an
indicator of a preference for the latter outcome. But the question that
this discovery would not and could not answer is whether anyone
should therefore stop using the citation count measure as a benchmark
for judicial performance. Arriving at an answer would require
normative discussion about principles of judicial evaluation—
principles that specify why certain considerations should count as
legitimate reasons for or against appointing someone as a judge. Any
given measure of performance may collapse into a prediction about
substantive case outcomes. This possibility does not show, however,
that the measurement project itself collapses into a predictive one.
Whatever an empirical theory of judicial performance might in fact be
measuring, it must always answer one normative question that a purely
predictive one need not answer: should the measures in question form
the basis for evaluating judges? For this reason, the project of
measuring judicial performance is inescapably normative in a way that
the goal of naturalizing jurisprudence is not.
Studies of judicial performance that seek to determine judicial
quality by quantitative measures (such as citation count) will ultimately
stand or fall on the strength of the normative reasons that can be
marshaled for valuing as judges the kind of individuals who do well on
those measures. Empirical measures of judicial performance ultimately
depend on normative claims about what it means for someone to be a
good judge, and the strength of any proposed empirical measure is
necessarily a direct function of the strength of the justification of those
normative claims. Theories about the causes of judicial performance
do not depend on these justifications. And no purely empirical project
can supply those justifications. That is a task for normative, not
empirical, inquiry.

